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PRECAP: Kohler v. Keller Transport, Inc.; Westchester Surplus Lines 
Insurance Company v. Keller Transport, Inc.: After a Confessed 
Judgment, is an Insurer Entitled to a Reasonableness Hearing in the 
Underlying Tort Action?  
Kristen Zadick  
Nos. DA 12-0600 and DA 14-0278  
Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Friday, September 11, 2015 at 10:00 AM in the Holiday 
Inn Missoula Downtown, Missoula, Montana.  
 
 
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 Does an insurer assume a duty to defend its insureds by voluntarily 
defending its insureds? If so, does an insurer breach its assumed duty to 
defend by withdrawing its defense prior to exhausting the policy limits?  
 
Following a confessed judgment against its insureds, is an insurer 
entitled to a hearing in the underlying action to review the 
reasonableness the judgment? If so, may the insurer intervene in the 
underlying action to contest the judgment? 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In April 2008, a 6,000-gallon gasoline spill contaminated a 
number of homes near Flathead Lake and forced the residents of the 
effected homes (“Homeowners”) to evacuate.1 The two cases 
consolidated for oral argument both arise from the spill.2 Prior to the 
spill, Keller and Wagner entered into an agreement under which Wagner 
hauled gasoline owned by Erickson Petroleum (“Erickson”) to Kalispell, 
Montana. While hauling the gasoline on Montana Highway 35, the 
tanker went off the road, spilling the gasoline.3 Soon after, Homeowners 
filed suit against Keller, Wagner, and Erickson in Lake County district 
court, alleging negligence for causing the accident.4 At the time of the 
spill, Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“Carolina”) provided 
primary insurance, and Westchester Lines Insurance Company 
(“Westchester”) provided excess insurance, to Keller and Wagner.5 The 
                                           
1 Br. of Appellant 3–4, Feb. 4, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.  
2 Order 2, July 22, 2015, Nos. DA 12-0600 and DA 14-0278.  
3 Br. of Appellant 3–4, No. DA 12-0600. 
4 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 5, Apr. 5, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.  
5 Id.  
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policies provided commercial automobile coverage and commercial 
general liability coverage (“CGL”).6 Following the accident, Carolina 
advanced payment for certain costs, but after exhausting its $1 million 
commercial automobile limit, Carolina withdrew and tendered the 
defense to Westchester.7  Westchester initially defended Keller and 
Wagner but withdrew after exhausting its $4 million commercial 
automobile limit.8  
 In August 2010, Carolina filed a declaratory judgment action in 
the Missoula County district court seeking rulings that (1) Carolina did 
not have a duty to defend Keller and Wagner in the tort action, (2) 
Carolina was entitled to reimbursement of its defense from Westchester, 
and (3) Carolina owed no coverage under the CGL policy.9 In late 
August 2010, Homeowners made a settlement offer based on the 
availability of CGL coverage, demanding $4 million from Westchester 
and $1 million from Carolina.  However, the insurers rejected the offer, 
prompting Wagner and Keller to enter settlement negotiations with 
Homeowners.10  
 Following Homeowners’ settlement with Erickson, Carolina and 
Westchester moved to intervene in the tort action to review the 
reasonableness of any judgments entered against its insureds.11  Before 
the Lake County district court ruled on the motions to intervene, 
Homeowners and Keller and Wagner settled their disputes through 
confessed judgments.12 The judgments provided that Keller and Wagner 
were jointly and severally liable for a $13 million judgment in 
Homeowners’ favor, offset by the $3 million settlement between 
Homeowners and Erickson.13 Homeowners agreed to seek recovery only 
from the insurers, and Keller and Wagner assigned their claims to 
Homeowners, allowing Homeowners to pursue any proceeds from Keller 
and Wagner’s insurance policies.14 
 In February 2011, the Lake County district court stayed the 
insurers’ motions to intervene pending the outcome of the insurance 
coverage action in the Missoula County district court.15  In August 2012, 
the Missoula County district court granted partial summary judgment 
against the insurers, holding Westchester and Carolina breached their 
duties to defend Keller and Wagner by withdrawing from the defense 
prior to exhausting the CGL coverage.16 Following the Missoula County 
                                           
6 Br. of Appellant 4, No. DA 12-0600.  
7 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 5–6, No. DA 12-0600.  
8 Id. at 6.  
9 Order 2, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.  
10 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 9, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.  
11 Order 2, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.  
12 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 8, No. DA 12-0600. 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 8–9.  
15 Id. at 9.  
16 Id. at 70, 74. 
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district court’s ruling that Westchester breached its duty to defend Keller 
and Wagner, the Lake County district court held Westchester’ motion to 
intervene was rendered moot.17 
 Shortly thereafter, Carolina settled with Homeowners, leaving 
claims against Westchester.18 The Missoula County district court 
reviewed the confessed judgment and found it reasonable.19  Westchester 





A. Duty to defend and breach 
 
 In granting partial summary judgment to Homeowners, the 
Missoula County district court determined Carolina and Westchester’s 
policies provided additional CGL coverage in the tort action,20 and that 
both Carolina and Westchester breached their duties to defend Keller and 
Wagner by withdrawing from the defense prior to exhausting the CGL 
limits.21 The court determined the policy language regarding a general 
aggregate limit was ambiguous and interpreted the ambiguity in favor of 
extending CGL coverage to the insureds.22 Further, the court held 
Westchester’s assumption of Keller and Wagner’s defense imposed a 
duty to continue the defense,23 and Westchester breached its duty by 
withdrawing its defense prior to exhausting the CGL limits.24 Reasoning 
that an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend makes the insurer liable for 
“any settlement and judgment,”25 the court concluded Westchester’s 
breach made it liable for the confessed judgment, despite the judgment 




 Appellant Westchester asserts it did not have a contractual duty 
to defend Keller and Wagner because the insurance contract “expressly 
provides that [Westchester has] no duty to defend.”27 Westchester further 
argues the court erred in its conclusion that Westchester assumed a duty 
to defend Keller and Wagner because the ruling ignores the terms of the 
                                           
17 Br. of Appellant 8, Feb. 4, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.  
18 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 3, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.  
19 Id. at 4.  
20 Order 79, Aug. 9, 2012, No. DV 10-1133.   
21 Id. at 70, 74.  
22 Id. at 60–61(citing Mitchell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 703, 709 (Mont. 2003)).  
23 Id. at 74.  
24 Id. at 79.  
25 Id. at 61(citing Indep. Milk & Cream Co. v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 216 P. 1109, 1111 (Mont. 1923)).  
26 Id. at 79.  
27 Br. of Appellant 16, Jan. 5, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.  
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policy providing for an “option” to associate with the defense and the 
right to withdraw from the defense after exhausting the policy limits.28  
Westchester argues a $4 million “general aggregate” provision 
unambiguously refers to the total limits under the policy, making its 
withdrawal after exhausting the $4 million limit proper.29  Westchester 
contends its withdrawal did not amount to a breach because Keller and 
Wagner’s defense was not prejudiced. Rather, Westchester and Carolina 
paid every invoice submitted by the insureds.30  
 The Appellees respond that Westchester failed to exhaust the 
excess policy limits before withdrawing from Keller and Wagner’s 
defense31 and breached its duty to defend the insureds,32 making it liable 
for the judgment.33 The Appellees assert that because the voluntary 
assumption of a contractual duty creates a duty,34 once Westchester 
chose to defend the insureds, it assumed a duty to continue the defense.35 
To rebut Westchester’s argument that “general aggregate” refers to the 
total limit available under the policy, the Appellees argue the term is 
ambiguous because a policy endorsement contradicts Westchester’s 
interpretation of the term.36 The endorsement provides that both the $4 
million commercial automobile coverage and the $4 million CGL 
coverage separately apply to each accident and payment for one accident 
does not reduce the insurer’s liability for another accident.37 Arguing that 
ambiguities in the insurance policy should be construed in favor of 
extending coverage,38 the Appellees argue the provision should be 
interpreted to extend CGL coverage to the insureds.39 Finally, while the 
Appellees argue an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend does not require 
a showing that the insured suffered prejudice, the Appellees contend 
Wagner suffered prejudice because its attorney fees went unpaid for five 
months after Westchester withdrew, preventing Wagner from retaining 
qualified experts.40 
 
2. Analysis  
 
 Whether Westchester had and breached a duty to defend Keller 
and Wagner is a threshold issue.  If Westchester did not have a duty to 
                                           
28 Id. at 19–20.  
29 Id. at 23–24.  
30 Id. at 31.  
31 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 29, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.  
32 Id. at 34.  
33 Id. at 39.  
34 See Stewart v. Stand. Publ’g Co., 55 P.2d 694, 696 (Mont. 1936); Sult v. Scandrett, 178 P.2d 405, 
406–07 (Mont. 1947).  
35 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 29, No. DA 14-0278.  
36 Id. at 15.  
37 Id. at 14–15.  
38 Id. at 13 (citing Mitchell, 68 P.3d at 709).  
39 Id. at 16.  
40 Id. at 45–46.  
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defend, or it did not breach the duty, Westchester is not liable for the 
confessed judgment.  While the parties agree the policy provides for an 
option to associate with the defense, the parties dispute whether 
Westchester assumed a duty to defend the insureds. Although the 
voluntary assumption of a contractual duty imposes such a duty,41 the 
Court has not applied this rule to an insurer’s assumption of a defense. 
However, to reach the remaining issues of the reasonableness of the 
confessed judgment and Westchester’s intervention motion, the Court 
may extend the rule and hold Westchester assumed a duty to continue the 
defense. Even if the Court determines Westchester had a duty to defend, 
the issues of Westchester’s breach and potential liability for the judgment 
remain. The Court could find that Westchester’s policy language 
unambiguously provides for a total $4 million limit under the policy, 
which would make Westchester’s withdrawal after expending that 
amount proper.   However, to reach the issues of reasonableness and 
Westchester’s intervention, the Court may find the “general aggregate” 
provision is ambiguous, which would extend CGL coverage to Keller 
and Wagner and make Westchester liable for a reasonable judgment 
entered against its insureds.  
 
B. Reasonableness Review 
 
 Although Westchester sought a review of the reasonableness of 
the stipulated judgment in the Lake County court, the court did not reach 
the reasonableness issue because it determined Westchester’s motion to 
intervene was moot.42  However, the Missoula County district court 
considered the reasonableness of the confessed judgment in the coverage 
action.43 Although the Missoula County court notes Montana law “does 
not impose a duty upon courts to review” a judgment where an insurer 
breaches its duty to defend its insured,44 the court conducted a 
reasonableness review because Westchester raised the reasonableness 
issue in that action.45 Accordingly, the court reviewed Homeowners’ and 
Keller and Wagner’s expert reports from the tort action, reasoning that 
the proper measure of reasonableness is the record of the underlying 
action.46 The court found the judgment to be reasonable, reasoning that a 
jury could have awarded the amount based on the evidence presented in 
the tort action.47  
 
                                           
41 Stewart v. Stand. Publ’n Co., 55 P.2d 694, 696 (Mont. 1936); Sult v. Scandrett, 178 P.2d 405,406–
07 (Mont. 1947).  
42 Order 6, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.  
43 Order 40, Mar. 25, 2014, No. DV 10-1133.  
44 Id. at 39 (quoting Nielsen v. TIG Ins. Co., 442 F.Supp.2d 972, 981 (D. Mont. 2006)).  
45 Id. at 43.  
46 Id. at 47–48.  
47 Id. at 48.  
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1. Arguments  
 
 Appellant Westchester argues the $13 million judgment merits a 
reasonableness hearing in the tort action because parties to a confessed 
judgment have little reason to set a reasonable amount of damages when 
only the insurer’s money is at stake.48 Recognizing that the insurer bears 
the duty to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
reasonableness of the judgment,49 Westchester asserts the judgment is 
unreasonable because it is “more than 43 times” the lost value of 
Homeowners’ property, the restoration plan presents a risk of harm to the 
environment and neighbors, and there is no evidence the plan would be 
successful.50 Westchester further argues the Lake County district court 
should conduct the reasonableness hearing in the tort action because that 
court is familiar with the facts underlying the judgment and only that 
court can modify the judgment.51   
 The Appellees respond that not only is Homeowners’ settlement 
with Keller and Wagner reasonable, but the Missoula County district 
court already conducted a reasonableness hearing.52  The Appellees 
argue that while a breaching does not have a procedural due process 
right to a reasonableness hearing, an insurer has a substantive due 
process right to a hearing only when the insurer presents evidence that 
creates a genuine issue of fact regarding the reasonableness of the 
judgment.53  Even where an insurer meets that burden, however, the 
district court conducting the hearing determines the nature and extent of 
the hearing.54 The Appellees argue Westchester conducted discovery, 
submitted expert reports, and argued at a reasonableness hearing in the 
insurance coverage action, and is not entitled to an additional hearing in 
the tort action.55 Although a subsequent Montana Supreme Court 
decision required a reasonableness hearing to be held in the underlying 
case,56 the Appellees argue that case is inapplicable because it involved 
collusion between the entities entering into the confessed judgment. 
Here, there are no allegations of collusion between Keller, Wagner, and 
Homeowners; rather, the confessed judgment is based on expert 
evidence. Westchester raised the reasonableness issue in the insurance 
coverage action and participated in “extensive proceedings” on that 
issue.57  
                                           
48 Br. of Appellant 36-37, Jan. 5, 2015, No. DA 14-0278 (citing Tidyman’s Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. 
Davis, 330 P.3d 1139, 1153 (Mont. 2014).  
49 Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1154.   
50 Br. of Appellant 37-39, No. DA 14-0278.  
51 Id. at 35-36.  
52 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 24, 39, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.  
53 Id. at 40 (citing Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1154).  
54 Id. (citing Abbey/Land, LLC v. Interstate Mech., Inc., 345 P.3d 1032, 1035 (Mont. 2015)).  
55 Id. at 45–46.  
56 Abbey/Land, 345 P.3d at 1035.  
57 Id.  




2. Analysis  
 
 The reasonableness of the confessed judgment, and whether the 
failure to hold a reasonableness hearing in the underlying tort action 
resulted in error, will likely constitute the majority of the oral argument. 
The parties dispute whether the hearing should be held in the underlying 
tort action or the declaratory judgment action. Although both parties rely 
on Tidyman’s to argue for and against a reasonableness hearing, 
Tidyman’s does not address the proper court in which to conduct a 
hearing. Further, although the court in Abbey/Land required a 
reasonableness hearing in the underlying action, the Court may find 
Abbey/Land is distinguishable because it involved collusion between the 
parties entering the confessed judgment, and because Westchester 
already litigated the reasonableness issue in the coverage action. Because 
the Abbey/Land rule did not exist at the time of Westchester’s 
reasonableness hearing, the Court may determine the failure to hold the 
reasonableness review in the underlying tort action is harmless. Since the 
court conducting the hearing determines the nature of the review,58 the 
Court may hold the reasonableness hearing in the coverage proceeding 




 Following the settlement between Homeowners and Keller and 
Wagner, the Lake County district court stayed Westchester’s intervention 
motion pending the Missoula County district court’s ruling on whether 
Westchester had and breached a duty to defend Keller and Wagner.59 
Reasoning that an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend makes the insurer 
liable for any judgments against its insured,60 the Lake County district 
court explained that if Westchester breached its duty to defend, the 
motion to intervene to contest the judgment would become moot because 
Westchester would be liable for the judgment.61 Conversely, if the 
Missoula County district court determined Westchester did not breach its 
duty to defend, but owed additional CGL coverage, the motion to 
intervene to contest damages would become ripe.62  After the Missoula 
County district court determined Westchester breached its duty to defend 
by withdrawing from the defense of Keller and Wagner, the Lake County 
district court accordingly held the motion to intervene was moot.63  
                                           
58 Id. at 1155.  
59 Order 2, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.  
60 See Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P.3d 381, 386 (Mont. 2004); Lee v. USAA 
Casualty Ins. Co., 86 P.3d 562, 565 (Mont. 2004).  
61 Order 5, No. DV 09-1. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 





 Appellant Westchester contends an issue becomes moot only 
when it ceases to exist and no longer presents an actual controversy.64 
Westchester argues the Lake County district court erred in finding that 
Westchester’s motion to intervene was moot because (1) the breach 
ruling, as a partial summary judgment ruling, is not final and does not 
prevent the Lake County district court from granting the motion; and (2) 
even if the breach ruling were final, it would not render a reasonableness 
hearing on damages moot.65 Accordingly, Westchester asserts it has a 
valid interest in the tort action, and should be allowed to intervene, 
because it is the only party that may be liable for the judgment.66  
Further, the Lake County district court is better situated to decide the 
reasonableness of the damages award, as opposed to the Missoula 
County district court, because the Lake County district court entered the 
judgment and has the power to modify the judgment.67  
 Responding to Westchester, the Appellees argue Westchester 
fails to satisfy the requirements for intervention as a matter of right under 
Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).68  First, Westchester’s motion to 
intervene is untimely because Westchester seeks intervention nearly two 
years after the case was commenced and after Westchester knew of its 
alleged interest in the case.69 Second, Westchester has no interest in the 
tort action because its rights and responsibilities will be resolved in the 
insurance coverage action.70 Third, Westchester’s interest is not impaired 
by not being a party to the tort action because Westchester cannot be 
required to pay the judgment absent a court order from the insurance 
coverage proceeding.71 Additionally, Westchester is not entitled to 
permissive intervention because it fails to satisfy the timeliness 
requirement.72 The Appellees argue public policy considerations support 
the denial of Westchester’s motion because intervention would allow 
Westchester to interfere with the defense, unfairly restricting the insureds 
and their independent counsel.73 
 
2. Analysis  
 
                                           
64 Br. of Appellant 17, Feb. 4, 2013, No. DA 12-0600 (quoting Med. Marijuana Growers Ass’n v. 
Corrigan, 281 P.3d 210, 214 (Mont. 2012)). 
65 Id. at 19.  
66 Id. at 28–29.  
67 Id. at 12–13.  
68 Appellee’s Resp. Br. 14, Apr. 5, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.  
69 Id. at 17–18.  
70 Id. at 24–25.  
71 Id. at 28.  
72 Id. at 31.  
73 Id. at 33.  
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 Because Westchester seeks to intervene in the tort action to 
contest the reasonableness of the confessed judgment, the intervention 
issue is contingent on Westchester’s right to a reasonableness hearing. If 
the Court holds Westchester is not entitled to an additional hearing, the 
Court will likely not decide this issue. Likewise, if the Court finds 
Westchester did not have a duty to defend Keller and Wagner, or did not 
breach a duty to defend, Westchester cannot be liable for the judgment, 
and its motion to intervene in the tort action would be irrelevant. 
Although the Appellees raise a valid question about the timeliness of 
Westchester’s motion to intervene, the dispute likely comes down to 
whether Westchester has an interest in the tort action. While Westchester 
claims its interest relates to its potential liability for the judgment, 
Westchester voluntarily withdrew from the defense of its insureds and 
forfeited its right to control the insureds’ defense. Further, Westchester 
participated in a separate coverage action to determine its liability for the 
judgment and litigated the reasonableness of the judgment. Because 
Westchester initiated and participated in the coverage action, the Court 
may find Westchester already litigated the issues it now seeks to raise in 
the tort action.  
 
 
 
